France bears a simi larity to Russia in its land orientation. Mahan tells Us how Frances delightful climate and rich soil lured its people away from the hard life found upon the seas, leaving the oceans largely to the British and Dutch. This is 'defined as the condition that exists when an adversary is denied the ability to use an area of sea for its own purposes Mahan argued that British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943). He wrote his treatise in 1911 specifically toward that end, balancing (like Clausewitz) the ways, means, and ends of naval war. There was an emerging power with . [3] Kenneth Hagan, American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 140; George Davis, A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), 32. [14] German[ edit] Sea Power as an organizing principle or even a grand strategy stems from a more holistic calculation of economic and geographic factors as well as contingent political choices. argue for a shift towards commercial expansion overseas, he did note that calls Markets in the, Copyright His understanding of the anarchical nature of international politics, the importance of geography to the global balance of power, the role of sea power in national security policy, and historys ability to shed light on contemporary world politics remains relevant to the 21st century world. The merchant marine performs the dual functions of economic trade and military logistics, as well as providing income and jobs, spreading Communism, collecting military intelligence, and helping to right the balance of payments. 1867, and increasing American influence over Hawaii by concluding a He concludes that Influence is not so much history as it is a naked warning to the United States about the cautionary example of continental France and the need to build a navy. A growing navalist movement in the United States capitalized on Influences publication to argue for investments in a blue-water, battleship navy. Mahan also grasped as early as 1901 the fundamental geopolitical realities of the Cold War that emerged from the ashes of the first two world wars. communications between the United States and its new markets. The merchant marine has grown from 400 ships in 1945 mustering 2 million tons deadweight to 1,700 ships in 1976 totaling 16 million tons deadweight, a growth rate of 425% in 31 years. [62] John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000 (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008). Sea power describesanation's ability to Indeed, many contemporary maritime strategists regard the Coast Guard as a white-hulled extension of the Navy rather than the linchpin in preserving U.S. maritime trade.9. Mahan provided a powerful argument for achieving and preserving sea power. Real Mahanian Sea Power (capital S; capital P), is not exclusively or even primarily a function of military force. [16] As what Margaret Sprout called an Evangelist of Sea Power, he was remarkably successful: The Mahanian phrase has been appropriated by all the other branches of the armed services with varying degrees of fidelity (land power, air power, and surely space power is not too far off in the future). John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking, 1988). Mahans most effective inquisitor in this regard has been American naval officer and educator Wayne P. Mahan conducted his basic research for Influence in the library of the English Club of Lima, Peru while he was stationed (sullenly) patrolling the Pacific coast of South America. The term itself entered the English language in the 1840s via the British classicist George Grotes History of Greece, which described the Minoans as a seapower or, alternately, thalassocracy.[15] Mahan split that word into its component parts for effect (maritime power was apparently too smooth for his liking) and then spread the concept with nearly religious zeal. Mahan is suspicious of democratic societies because they may struggle to maintain naval funding during peacetime (witness U.S. demobilization after the Civil War). In 1883, he authored his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters, a study of naval engagements in the Civil War. Naval Academy in 1859, served in the Union Navy during the Civil War, and thereafter served on numerous ships and at several naval stations until finding his permanent home at the Naval War College. [74] Major continental powers can build naval force (or sea power, two words) but are unlikely to become seapowers because they lack an identity anchored in maritime traditions. [71] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). In 1890, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a lecturer in naval [60] E.L. Godkin, Navalism, Nation, Vol. II (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1905), 164. An armed force at sea, Mahan writes with serene confidence, naturally and healthfully springs from the need to defend seaborne commerce. [20] Mahans only book dedicated to strategy and tactics as such was, by his own admission, the worst writing he ever produced. for a vigorous foreign policy were signs that Americans were increasingly The book brought Mahan fame in his lifetime and ever since. Mahan happened upon his thesis in Lima in the immediate aftermath of the War of the Pacificfought between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile between 1879-1884a conflict that, as much as any in the industrial era, illustrated the concrete influences of Sea Power on regional order. The ghost of Nelson at Trafalgar hangs over the concept, as it does over much of Mahans worksee his hagiographical The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain.[19]. Alabama; it can only be a secondary goal of naval action. Seward also attempted to purchase suitable Caribbean naval bases. [11] Hugues Canuel, From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune Ecole, (2018) Naval War College Review: Vol. Summary. [67] While this school of criticism was right to stress Mahans pervasive racism and interest in overseas possessions, LaFeber and the revisionists overestimated Mahans pre-1895 influence as well as the scope of his explicit imperial ambitionswhich were always more pointillist than territorial. Ronald Spector, Professors at War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977). Following the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward had attempted to Jon Tetsuro Sumida, New Insights from Old Books: The Case of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval War College Review 54, no. Stephen Roberts (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987). Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and his Letters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977). [72] Factors like size and population might matter to sea power, but are far more relevant to calculations of raw geopolitical or landpower strengthas anyone contemporaneously counting Soviet infantry divisions in Eastern Europe could attest. [88] Likewise, though World War II was not settled in a single fleet encounter, decisive naval engagements were key to winning whole theaters of the war. Jomini's work depended heavily on fixed principles that could be stated with mathematical precision and comprehensiveness. Between Mackinder and Mahan, the Dutch-American thinker Nicholas Spykman struck something of Solomonic balance. A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land, (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1911). Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Transaction Books) and Americas Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics, and War (University Press of America). as the coaling stations and naval bases that Mahan had discussed, such as Puerto Understanding them is important if conflict is to be avoided. Mahan was not alone in urging this. [54] Methodological critiques aside (taken rather too exclusively from French sources *sniff*), the text earned him honorary degrees from Cambridge and Oxford, among other laurels. Like a piece of stained glass held up to the light, the Mahanian concept of sea power is many things at once, depending on ones perspective. Nonetheless, Mahan as a historian could actually be quite sensitive, particularly in his use of analogy and comparison. Navy. These works brought Mahan world renown. [51] After defeating Peru in a decisive naval battle in 1879, Chile leveraged its maritime preponderance to cut off Peruvian trade, finance war spending, and move amphibious armies along the Peruvian coast. Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters and minimized strength in distant seas, while Fisher reversed Mahan by utilizing technological change to propose submarines for defense of home waters and mobile battle cruisers for protection of distant imperial interests. He is a graduate of Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a doctoral candidate in atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, College Park. Jeremy Greenwood and Emily Miletello, To Expand the Navy Isnt Enough. Consider the context: By the 1880s, railway lines knit together the United States continental empire from the Atlantic to the Pacific. [22] Mahan, Influence, 71. In 1890, United States Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan published a book titled "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History." The monumental text addressed the importance of both military and commercial fleets in the success of a nation in war and peacetime. Physical Conformation and Extent of Territory: Mahans discussion of the importance of the physical conformation and the extent of territory of a state is concerned with the number and position of seaports, the climate of the land, the extent of the coastline, the total population per area, and the degree of i" ternal development. [61] Mackinder, Geographical Pivot of History, 421-437. He called for a more active U.S. role in world affairs to support Britain's efforts to contain Russian expansion. Work on the long-planned Muse-Kyaukphyu line is once again inching forward, but construction is likely many years off. 4 (1904): 421-437. Dalam membangun sebuah negara yang memiliki kekuatan Angkatan Laut yang besar, menurut Astawa (2004) Sea Power Mahan diperlukan 6 (enam) elemen pokok From time to time, he wrote, the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock.[78] The strategic principles of concentration, decisive engagement, control of communications, and offensive action all translated from the Age of Sail, while specific tactics required revision as a result of technical advances. [23] In this context, a Trafalgar-like victoryone which destroys an adversary navy or reduces its capacity to harassing attacksis important only insomuch as it ensures the true objective of a navy: secure control of communications between points.[24]. See also: Dingman, Japan and Mahan in The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahans The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, ed. Securing such access would require three things: a merchant navy, which could carry American products to new markets across the great highway of the high seas; an American battleship navy to deter or destroy rival fleets; and a network of naval bases capable of providing fuel and supplies for the enlarged navy, and maintaining open lines of communications between the United States and its new markets. Admiral John Jellicoes turn away from the retreating German High Seas Fleet would have been an acute disappointment for the offensively minded Mahan.[87]. A final geographic disadvantage is the number of straits Soviet ships must pass through in order to gain the open seas. It details the role of sea power throughout history and discusses the various factors needed to support a strong navy.Alfred Thayer Mahan (September 27, 1840 - December 1, 1914) was a United States naval officer and historian, whom John Keegan called "the . B. [45] The final triumph of British Sea Power was (predictably) the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire through command of the sea after Trafalgarthe Salamis or Armada of its age. In addition to icebreaking in northern ports, its collective activities ensure the integrity and continued viability of U.S. maritime trade. . (That year the U. S. operated 22 shipyards which employed 234,000 people.) In the last decades of the nineteenth century navies grappled with the problem of preparing their officer corps for future wars, while the pace of technological change was accelerating, and there were few conflicts to inform the development of tactical and strategic doctrine. Information, United States Department of [79] Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986/2000/2018). Today, as it was in Mahans day, the character of a nations peopletheir inclination toward the seais one of a handful of factors that will determine Russias role and rank on the seas in the years ahead. [1] A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 [hereafter Influence] (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1898). However, in the combined 840 pages of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History:16601783 and The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future, Mahan does not investigate the role of a nations coast guard. }, Page last modified: These geographical features, while foundational to Mahans theory, are not destiny. cOMPRAR. Based largely on those factors, Mahan envisioned the United States as the geopolitical successor to the British Empire. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was a US Navy officer and author of influential marine history and strategy books. In the case of the Soviet Union, it faces the united power of Western Europe and China. 4 (April 2021). In subsequent articles and books, Mahan accurately envisioned the geopolitical struggles of the 20th and 21st centuries. Today, as nations increasingly deploy their coast guards to assert sovereignty, the role of coast guards within Mahans conceptions of maritime powernamely, to maintain a nations access to the global commons and thereby bolster its domestic shipping capabilitywarrants further examination. To become a major naval power, the United States began to replace its wooden sailing ships with Book Cover of the 12th Edition of Thayer Mahans The Influence of Sea We and our partners use data for Personalised ads and content, ad and content measurement, audience insights and product development. Since 1945, the maintenance of Freedom of the Seas through a preponderant navy and a vast archipelago of overseas bases has remained a consistent feature of the U.S.-led post-war order. He has written articles and reviews on historical and foreign policy topics for Strategic Review, American Diplomacy, Joint Force Quarterly, the University Bookman, the Washington Times, the Claremont Review of Books, and other publications. Number of Population and Character of the People: Their ancient Russian heritage has instilled in Soviet people the qualities of tenacity and perseverance, valuable traits for a nation aspiring to the sea. 5 (JANUARY 1964), pp. Mahan focuses much of his effort towards the "blue-water" Navy, while Julian Corbett[6], in contrast, focuses more intently on the connection between sea and landpower, and the limitations therein. William Leeman and John B. Hattendorf, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2020). Alfred Thayer Mahans mediocre and often frustrated career as a USN officer spanned exactly this nadir of U.S. naval capabilities. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. 149/3/1,441. . The 1890s were marked by social and economic unrest throughout the United States, New and expanding corporations had built industrial productivity to rival that of the North Atlantic Great Powers. Commercial interests increasingly looked overseas, eyeing opportunities in Latin American and East Asia, as well as the territorial infrastructure (the Panama Canal and coaling stations) necessary to exploit them. In the 21st century, even as technologies advance, the core insights of Mahan and his method remain fundamental. States as spatial organisms Chapter 2 - Rudolph Challen and Friedrich Naumann "Central Europe" Chapter 3 - Halford Mackinder "The Geographical Axis of History" [89] See examples like the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, Applied History Project and University of Texas Clements Center for National Security. Review by Dr. Joseph Moretz, Ph D, FRHistS. Eight years before the Spanish-American War resulted in the United States becoming a world power with overseas possessions, Mahan wrote an article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled The United States Looking Outward, (1890) in which he urged U.S. leaders to recognize that our security and interests were affected by the balance of power in Europe and Asia. Account & Lists Returns & Orders. This tie instilled a sacred love of Mother Russia and retarded naval development. the 1890s, but his work resonated with many leading intellectuals and From the time of their publication, the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan have framed dialogues on U.S. sea power, sea control, and maritime strategy. Empire, 17931812, Current As Mahan puts it when discussing the War of the Spanish Succession: The sea power of England therefore was not merely in the great navy, with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had had such a navy in 1688, and it shriveled away like a leaf in the fire.[93] In this respect, Mahan actually shares a great deal with later critics who highlight the importance of a dynamic economy as the ultimate source of national or imperial power. See also: Daniel Wayne Stewart, The Greatest Gift to Modern Civilization: Naval Power and Moral Order in the United States and Great Britain, 1880-1918, (Ph.D. [62] As Mackinder conceived it, the Eurasian heartland is surrounded by an Inner Crescent of Western Europe, the Middle East, and South and North East Asia. 16, No. Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.). Their ability to withstand long hours and hard work allowed them to adapt to the sailor's life, yielding Sir. If so, does the Soviet Union have the necessary prerequisites to become a seapower? Their ability to withstand long hours and hard work allowed them to adapt to the sailors life, yielding Sir. A German navy, supreme by the fall of Great Britain, he warned, with a supreme German army able to spare readily a large expeditionary force for over-sea operations, is one of the possibilities of the future. The rivalry between Germany and Great Britain to-day, he continued, is the danger point, not only of European politics but of world politics as well. It remained so for 35 years. Rodgers magisterial The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. Mahan, a naval strategist and the author of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, argued that national prosperity and power depended on control of the world's sea-lanes. [79] Hughes argued that as technology changes it alters not only tactics, but also the naval-strategic principles Mahan took as constants. Panama. Relations, World Wide Diplomatic Archives abroad. The distances between these seas, moreover, are greater than those that hampered France, and the seas themselves are entirely cut off from the major oceans of the w.orld. A great navy is one designed to fight an enemy in fleet engagements in order to win command of the sea, not one designed for commerce raiding or guerre de course. [85] Admiral Mahan, New York Times, December 2, 1914. [56] In the Pacific, Mahan claimed (self-consciously) that more of his works were translated into Japanese than any other language (though his precise impact on Imperial Japanese Navy policy is a contested one; note work by Sadao Asada, who is careful to acknowledge that Mahans theory was often more justification for ongoing Japanese naval expansion than genuine inspiration).[57]. Dutton & Co., 1968), 35. Corbett is far more interested in naval tactics, operations, and their various applications to limited war. In an age of technological change, these ideas began to seem obsolete to an influential group of American naval leaders. sense, sea power and cyber power share a common objective. This force, which averages more than 50 ships, is supplied by the extensive U.S.S.R- met' chant marine and fleet auxiliaries, a tenuous combi' nation if the Soviet Navy should have to go to 'var against the solidly based U. S. Sixth Fleet. Vol. He further understood that predominant Anglo-American sea power in its broadest sense was the key to ensuring the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia. For a modern sailor he is technically underdeveloped, crude, and haphazard in his work. For all of its success, criticsand there have been manyhave found ample fault with Mahans method and conclusions. Search for jobs related to Mahan six principles of sea power or hire on the world's largest freelancing marketplace with 21m+ jobs. One hundred years later, the insights of the American strategist continue to have extraordinary relevance today. As he noted in his 1902 Presidential Address to the AHA, the artistic unity of a historical project often necessitated the subordination of contradictory evidence around a central theme, lest a more subtle argument mislead lay readers. In The Problem of Asia, Mahan urged statesmen to glance at the map of Asia and note the vast, uninterrupted mass of the Russian Empire, stretching without a break . The course which the Soviet Union sails at sea will be derived from within the vast, complicated machinations of the political system. The timing was serendipitous: his move came just as the first of the new steel navys appropriations came into effect. In Influence, Mahan offers two possible formulas for grand strategic Sea Power. While Turner did not explicitly [31] (Semi-)Colonial peoples the world over could no doubt empathize. [49]In asking what lessons might flow from the influence of Roman sea power on the fall of the Carthaginian Empire, Mahan arrived at the germ of his project. He famously listed six fundamental elements of sea. of the Secretaries of State, Travels of It was his second book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (1890), however, that brought him national and international fame. What do we know about him? Captain, later Rear-Admiral, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was an American naval officer and historian . navy to deter or destroy rival fleets; and a network of naval bases capable of [4] All the while, the U.S. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 is a history of naval warfare published in 1890 by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Keegan, the Price of Admiralty: the Man and his method fundamental... 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